Someone once said that "it's just a false alarm" are the most beautiful words in the world. You only truly appreciate that when you've stared down the barrel of losing everything.

On September 2, 2025, I came terrifyingly close to watching $13 million in my wallet vanish into thin air. This was a phishing attack masterminded by the infamous Lazarus hacker group from North Korea.

If not for the swift intervention of some top-notch security teams, this could have been a total disaster. Instead, it ended as a close call. Here's my full recount from the victim's side.

The Trigger: A Seemingly Normal Meeting Invite

I first met this person claiming to be the Asia BD for Stack at the Hong Kong Wanxiang Conference in April 2025. A friend introduced us in person, and another friend had mentioned Stack's team before, suggesting potential collaboration. We exchanged contacts and added each other on Telegram.

Last Friday (August 29), this BD reached out to schedule a catch-up meeting at 11:00 PM. My previous meeting ran long, so I joined around 11:10. He said no problem in the TG group.

The meeting link was for Zoom. I didn't think twice about it then, but looking back, Zoom has become a common vector for Lazarus attacks (check out this Huntability report for more analysis).

The Trap: An Innocent-Looking "Upgrade"

Because I was late, I felt guilty and rushed. When I joined, I saw him and a few supposed colleagues on video, but there was no audio. Immediately, a prompt popped up: "Your microphone isn't working. You need to upgrade."

In that moment of panic and guilt, I lost my cool:

I wanted to fix the delay I'd caused;

I clicked "upgrade" without a second thought.

Turns out, that was the hackers' bait.

The Calculated Strike: A Tailor-Made Attack

Replaying it later, I realized this wasn't random—it was highly customized for me.

They deployed the attack contract on Monday, tailored to my portfolio. My assets were mostly in Venus, with a lot of borrowed liabilities, unlike typical setups. From Venus's official report here, you can see how complex that transaction was, with tons of targeted operations.

They even knew I use Rabby wallet often, so they might have swapped in a fake Rabby extension in my Chrome.

Here's how it went down:

I opened my computer, Chrome crashed unusually, asking if I wanted to restore tabs (suspicious in hindsight, maybe from a malicious extension). I said yes, opened Venus in a restored tab, and did a routine withdraw.

If it was the real Rabby, its risk controls would have:

1. Flagged the contract risk and required manual confirmation;

2. Shown a simulation of the transaction.

But with the fake one, no warnings. It felt just like any other withdraw I'd done hundreds of times.

That "familiarity" and smoothness completely disarmed me. By the time I realized, it was too late.

After sending the transaction, Chrome crashed again, the computer lagged, and when I reopened, my Google account was logged out. No USDT withdrawn, but checking the browser revealed a suspicious transaction. Panic set in.

Chillingly, I later learned from friends that this BD's TG account had been hacked earlier. From the start, I was dealing with an imposter.

Hackers exploit that "semi-familiar" relationship: not total strangers to raise alarms, not close enough to spot inconsistencies in behavior.

The Truth: Fake Identities, Deepfakes, and Lazarus

Based on the methods, gas sources, and similar cases, this was likely Lazarus. The "colleagues" in the video? Probably deepfake faces.

I heard a Venus community admin fell for the same Zoom phishing months ago, losing deposits without recovery.

The Turning Point: Security Teams Step In

Right after, I contacted PeckShield and SlowMist. Dr. Jiang (@xuxian_jiang) quickly looped in the Venus team.

We weren't acquainted, but they paused the protocol upon seeing the anomaly:

1. My account had 5 assets with heavy borrowing;

2. The hacker's complex transaction transferred most assets, including liabilities;

3. Totally unlike normal user behavior.

Pausing, auditing contracts, checking for frontend hijacks—all crucial. Their decisiveness stopped Lazarus.

Reflections: Lessons Learned

This highlights how North Korean hackers have evolved to combine social engineering, deepfakes, and tech Trojans. Even video calls and verified Twitter profiles can be faked.

I was using a hardware wallet, theoretically the safest, but DeFi's complex interactions require blind signing.

The hackers faked the Rabby extension, making everything look normal, with no wallet alerts.

When signing on the hardware, it's hard to verify the real transaction logic if the input is tainted.

Harsh truth: Hardware wallets aren't foolproof if extensions or frontends are compromised.

Safety Tips for the Industry and Individuals

Ditch Zoom for sensitive stuff: It's a hotspot for Lazarus attacks.

Download extensions only from official sources; ignore pop-up "upgrades."

Use hardware wallets, but don't rely solely on them—combine with frontend checks.

Don't trust semi-acquaintances: Videos, voices, meetings can all be deepfaked.

Stay skeptical: Pause and think before any odd request, even "upgrade microphone."

Wrapping Up

This was a close encounter with Lazarus.

Thanks to teams like @VenusProtocol, @peckshield, @binance, @chaos_labs, @hexagate_, @HypernativeLabs, and @SlowMist_Team, we prevailed—or at least didn't lose big. It feels like winning the lottery, as most Lazarus victims never recover funds.

But it drove home: In crypto, the biggest risk isn't market volatility—it's that moment you think "it's fine."